Examining Spillover Effects from Teach For America Corps Members in Miami-Dade County Public Schools by Ben Backes et al.
NATIONAL  
CENTER for ANALYSIS of LONGITUDINAL DATA in EDUCATION RESEARCH
A program of research by the American Institutes for Research with Duke University, Northwestern University,  
Stanford University, University of Missouri-Columbia, University of Texas at Dallas, and University of Washington 
W O R K I N G  P A P E R  1 1 3   •   J U N E  2 0 1 4
Examining Spillover 
Effects from Teach 
For America Corps 
Members in Miami-
Dade County Public 
Schools
M I C H A E L  H A N S E N ,  B E N 
B A C K E S ,  V I C T O R I A  B R A D Y ,  
A N D  Z E Y U  X U
TRACKING EVERY STUDENT’S  LEARNING EVERY YEAR
i 
 
Contents  
 
 
 
Contents ......................................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................ iii 
I. Motivation and Background ...................................................................................................................... 1 
II. Research Questions................................................................................................................................... 3 
III. TFA Placement in Miami-Dade ................................................................................................................. 4 
IV. Theory of Action ...................................................................................................................................... 6 
V. Data ........................................................................................................................................................... 9 
VI. Empirical Strategy .................................................................................................................................. 13 
VII. Results ................................................................................................................................................... 16 
VIII. Discussions of Findings and Limitations .............................................................................................. 21 
IX. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 22 
References .................................................................................................................................................. 24 
Appendix I. Data Cleaning Rules for Analysis .............................................................................................. 33 
Appendix II. Identifying TFA Corps Members in the M-DCPS Administrative Data .................................... 36 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
 
This work was produced under financial support from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. We 
gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of Miami-Dade County Public Schools, especially Gisela Feild, in 
providing data access, research support, and allowing us to interview district and school personnel 
regarding Teach For America. We acknowledge the cooperation of Teach For America’s national and 
Miami regional offices in conducting this research. We thank Jeff Nelson for excellent research 
assistance, and helpful comments from Raegen Miller, Jason Atwood, Rachel Perera, and participants in 
presentations of findings at the Knight Foundation and the 2014 AEFP Conference. CALDER working 
papers have not gone through final formal review and should be cited as working papers. They are 
intended to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication.  
The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the American Institutes 
for Research, its trustees, or any of the funders or supporting organizations mentioned herein. Any 
errors are attributable to the authors. 
 Disclosure: The Knight Foundation funded both the TFA clustering strategy and this external evaluation 
of that strategy. The Knight Foundation, Teach For America, and Miami-Dade County Public Schools 
were cooperative in facilitating this evaluation and received early drafts of these findings, but none had 
editorial privilege over the actual contents or findings presented here. The CALDER Center has a current 
contract with Teach For America to conduct a separate evaluation of corps member impacts in a 
different region of the country, which Teach For America procured through a competitive bid process. 
These evaluations are independent of each other, and TFA has no editorial influence in the presentation 
of findings in neither the current study nor this separate contract. 
 
CALDER • American Institutes for Research 
1000 Thomas Jefferson Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007 
202-403-5796 • www.caldercenter.org 
iii 
 
Examining Spillover Effects from Teach For America Corps Members in Miami-Dade County 
Public Schools 
Michael Hansen, Ben Backes, Victoria Brady and Zeyu Xu 
June 2014 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Despite a large body of evidence documenting the effectiveness of Teach For America (TFA) corps 
members at raising the math test scores of their students, little is known about the program’s impact at 
the school level. TFA’s recent placement strategy in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS), 
where large numbers of TFA corps members are placed as clusters into a targeted set of disadvantaged 
schools, provides an opportunity to evaluate the impact of the TFA program on broader school 
performance. This study examines whether the influx of TFA corps members led to a spillover effect on 
other teachers’ performance. We find that many of the schools chosen to participate in the cluster 
strategy experienced large subsequent gains in math achievement. These gains were driven in part by 
the composition effect of having larger numbers of effective TFA corps members. However, we do not 
find any evidence that the clustering strategy led to any spillover effect on school-wide performance. In 
other words, our estimates suggest that extra student gains for TFA corps members under the clustering 
strategy would be equivalent to the gains that would result from an alternate placement strategy where 
corps members were evenly distributed across schools. 
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I. Motivation and Background 
Teach For America (TFA) is an alternative certification program that has demonstrated success in 
placing intensively selected recent college graduates and mid-career professionals into classrooms 
serving high-need students.  Yet, little is known about the program’s impact beyond the classrooms of 
individual corps members. TFA’s recent placement strategy in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools 
(M-DCPS), where many TFA corps members are placed as clusters into a targeted set of disadvantaged 
schools, provides a unique research opportunity to evaluate the impact of the TFA program on schools 
beyond the simple assignment of individual corps members. This paper investigates this clustering 
strategy to understand the broader influence of TFA corps members on their teacher colleagues and the 
schools in which they are placed.  
TFA operates by recruiting and training graduates from selective colleges or other young 
professionals to teach for two years in high-need public schools, filling vacancies that are otherwise 
considered difficult to staff. Several prior evaluations of TFA corps members’ classroom performance 
conclude they outperform comparison teachers in math (and science, where tests are available), but 
perform at similar levels in reading. These evaluations come from both experimental (Clark, et al., 2013; 
Glazerman, et al., 2006) and quasi-experimental (Boyd, et al., 2006; Kane, et al., 2008; Xu, et al., 2011) 
research designs.1 The increased productivity of TFA corps members is presumed to be driven largely by 
TFA’s ability to select high-quality candidates for placement in the classroom, though TFA’s specific role 
in that selection process is still being examined in the research literature.2 
                                                          
1
 An exception to these findings is an early study from Boyd et al. (2006), which examines test scores of New York 
City grade 4-8 students and finds no significant difference between TFA and traditionally-trained teachers in math. 
Their only statistically significant finding for TFA teachers is for first-year middle school TFA math teachers relative 
to other beginning teachers, where students taught by TFA teachers score about 0.05 standard deviations higher. 
2
 Xu, et al., (2011) estimate the TFA effect is primarily driven by selecting candidates with high observable 
characteristics (selective universities, high Praxis scores, etc.), though Clark, et al. (2013) find that the TFA effect 
cannot be explained by these differences in observables. Dobbie (2011) uses data on TFA rubrics in evaluating 
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The impact of TFA’s placements on the broader school has not previously been examined, 
though TFA believes the presence of its corps members can be transformational. One can reasonably 
hypothesize corps members may boost the productivity of the schools in which they are placed through 
spillover effects onto other teachers—both by complementing other TFA corps members and positively 
impacting non-TFA teachers in the school—which may affect the overall culture and performance of a 
school.  The spillover effects may become more pronounced, in theory, as the number of TFA corps 
members clustered in a school increases.  Evidence that teachers influence other teachers’ productivity 
is found in Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), who find that students perform better when their teachers’ 
peers improve over time. This spillover effect is especially pronounced for inexperienced teachers, 
which is relevant in our setting since TFA teachers generally have few years of experience. 
TFA’s clustering placement strategy in the district plays a key role in identifying credible spillover 
effects. TFA generally targets the highest-need schools in attempting to place their corps members, 
which implies students’ unobservable tendency to score poorly in these schools may bias attempts to 
identify spillover effects with the use of between-school variation. Yet, using within-school variation of 
TFA corps members may be endogenously driven in typical circumstances: principals’ decisions to hire 
more or fewer TFA corps members likely depends on their experience in the past, which may in part be a 
response to corps members’ effects on other teachers in the school.  Endogenous variation in TFA 
staffing within schools would likewise be detrimental to these estimates. In recent years, some schools 
in M-DCPS stopped hiring TFA altogether and others began hiring many more due largely to the new 
clustering strategy. These changes in TFA levels within schools over a short time period are more 
plausibly exogenous, and hence lend to more credible estimates of any spillover effects. 
This evaluation also relates to research examining school turnaround. Two years after TFA 
instituted the cluster placement strategy on their own, they formally partnered with M-DCPS’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
corps member applications and finds these measures to be predictive of performance in the classroom, 
independent of other observable characteristics. 
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Education Transformation Office (ETO), the office established to oversee school turnaround efforts in 
the district. The ETO works with low-performing schools to help them implement one of the four 
federally prescribed turnaround models to improve school performance. One of these models, the 
turnaround model, prescribes low-performing schools to turnover at least 50 percent of the low-
performing school’s teaching staff. This partnership between TFA and the ETO enabled TFA to channel 
corps members specifically into schools that were labeled as chronic low performers. While this 
partnership may aid schools to build committed staffs in short order, prior evidence of success for this 
strategy is generally weak overall, as described in the Institute of Education Science’s Practice Guide on 
the topic (Herman, et al., 2008). However, a more recent, rigorous study of school turnaround efforts in 
California point to the turnaround model as having the largest associated effect of the four federally 
prescribed models (Dee, 2012), further supporting the rationale behind these models. How well this 
strategy of using clusters of TFA corps members to help fill staffing needs in these turnaround schools is 
an open question that is part of our inquiry here. 
II. Research Questions 
This evaluation has two guiding research questions: 
1. How does the density of TFA-affiliated teachers within a school affect the performance 
of all other teachers in schools, as measured by test scores of their students? 
 
2. How does increasing the number of TFA-affiliated teachers in a school differentially 
affect the performance of active TFA corps members in their schools? 
To answer these questions, we use administrative data from M-DCPS for the five school years 
between 2008-2009 and 2012-2013 to estimate spillover effects from TFA teachers to others by 
exploiting variation in the within-school TFA density inherent in the M-DCPS clustering placement 
strategy.  
In addition to the administrative data primarily used here, the study team also conducted live 
semi-structured interviews with district personnel who work with the TFA program and school principals 
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or assistant principals in schools where TFA corps members have been placed since the 2009-10 school 
year. Though an analysis of this qualitative data is beyond the scope of this paper, we supplement the 
empirical analysis presented here with interview responses where appropriate. A more focused analysis 
of the qualitative data from this project is forthcoming. 
III. TFA Placement in Miami-Dade  
TFA has been placing corps members in M-DCPS since 2003, which began with 35 initial 
placements.3 During the early period of TFA’s presence in the district, the placement of corps members 
in schools did not adhere to an overarching strategy—aside from the main criterion of placing corps 
members in schools with high levels of student poverty (student bodies exceeding 70 percent eligibility 
for free or reduced-price lunch), teachers were placed wherever TFA could establish sufficient rapport 
with school principals as to allow TFA candidates to be considered for vacancies. This approach to 
placement resulted in TFA corps members being spread thinly across many schools in the district. By the 
summer of 2008, TFA’s yearly cohort size was approaching 50 corps members, resulting in a total 
presence of 90 active corps members (representing two cohorts) assigned across 48 schools during the 
following school year.   
Beginning with the 2009-10 school year, TFA began a clustering strategy in which new 
placements were purposely assigned to schools within designated high-need communities. TFA’s 
clustering placement strategy grew out of an interest in accelerating TFA’s impact on student outcomes. 
Based on conversations with those originally involved in the design of the clustering strategy, these 
accelerated outcomes were presumed to be achieved through several means. First, by placing multiple 
corps members in the same schools TFA expected to increase corps members’ satisfaction and sense of 
support from the program, which was hoped to lead to better outcomes among active corps members 
                                                          
3
 This section draws heavily on conversations with the TFA Miami regional office, as well as personnel in the M-
DCPS central office. We thank them for generously providing details of the program. 
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and higher retention after their two-year commitment ended. Second, students in these schools were 
expected to now have multiple opportunities for being exposed to TFA corps members, thus potentially 
making a cumulative effect on the high-need student populations in targeted schools.4 And third, TFA 
believed a critical mass of young, energetic corps members would possibly spillover into non-TFA 
teachers’ classrooms, and potentially affect the whole school (the primary focus of this paper). Beyond 
these benefits to students, TFA also expected that higher concentrations of corps members in fewer 
schools was beneficial from a management perspective: by virtue of working in fewer sites, TFA could 
better manage and build deeper relationships with building-level administrators as well as provide in-
person support to corps members more efficiently.  The new placement strategy was conceived by the 
regional TFA office located in Miami, endorsed by M-DCPS, and encouraged with external funding. Since 
being implemented in M-DCPS, this placement strategy has been loosely replicated in other, mostly 
rural, TFA regions.  
The TFA clustering strategy soon became one piece in a larger school turnaround effort of M-
DCPS’s ETO, which was developed in 2010, and designed to serve those schools designated as the 
“persistently lowest-achieving.” Due to the natural overlap in the targeted schools for both TFA and the 
ETO, they partnered to start placing TFA teachers in select ETO schools starting in the 2011-12 school 
year. Both entities viewed this as a mutually beneficial partnership—the ETO valued the flow of corps 
members to vacancies that are otherwise difficult to staff,5 while TFA viewed this as a way to 
strategically target their efforts in the highest need schools, which was expected to maximize their 
                                                          
4
 Follow-up studies in this project intend to evaluate the success of the clustering strategy in retaining corps 
members after their two-year commitment, and the cumulative effective of exposure to multiple TFA-affiliated 
teachers on student achievement over time. 
5
 TFA placements under the clustering strategy are still heavily dependent upon position vacancies and principal 
buy-in. Neither schools nor the district made explicit decisions to fill a certain number of vacancies with TFA 
teachers, but rather considered the pool of eligible incoming TFA candidates to fill vacancies. The ultimate decision 
to hire a TFA corps member was left to school principals, though under the clustering strategy principals had to 
begin to accept at least two TFA corps members in the same school. Thus, the density of TFA corps members in a 
school was determined by available vacancies, principals’ selection of corps members to fill vacancies, and the size 
of the TFA corps cohort, rather than TFA strategically targeting a certain threshold of TFA corps members in each 
school. 
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impact on students. This partnership further accelerated the growth of the total number of corps 
members working in the district. 
The growth of the TFA corps and its density is readily apparent in the placement numbers during 
the five school years of the data used for this analysis. Table 1 presents TFA corps member assignment 
figures over time. In the 2008-09 school year, the year immediately preceding the clustering strategy, 
there was an average of slightly less than two TFA corps members in each school where they were 
placed. In the years following, the number of schools containing any TFA dropped by about half and the 
number of active TFA corps members in the district more than tripled, resulting in an average of nearly 
10 corps members per school where there was any presence.6 The net result was a jump in the 
proportion of TFA corps members in placement schools, going from 2-4% in 2008-09 to 14-18% in 2012-
13.   
IV. Theory of Action  
With its clustering strategy, TFA corps members might affect the overall performance of the 
school in at least two distinct ways: through a composition effect and a spillover effect. The composition 
effect relies on the makeup of the teacher workforce to determine the school’s overall productivity—if 
TFA corps members are more effective than the prior teachers whom they replace, then the school 
improves simply as a mechanical result of getting better teachers. Given prior evidence of TFA corps 
members’ classroom performance—in math (and science), at least—this composition effect is likely, but 
is not our primary focus in this paper. Our interest here is in the possible spillover effect. 
The spillover effect is less direct. It presumes that all teachers affect each other: more effective 
peers will promote effectiveness in colleagues. Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) present convincing 
                                                          
6
 When conducting interviews with school and district administrators, one concern we heard about the large 
increase in TFA placements was a potential dilution of the quality of the TFA pool due to the district filling about 
three times as many placements with TFA corps members. Any decrease in quality could also be a confounding 
factor in our attempt to identify spillover effects. We address this issue further in Section VII below.  
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evidence of productivity spillovers among elementary school teachers in North Carolina, presumably 
arising through sharing instructional resources, coaching each other, or simply motivating each other. 
The authors find novice teachers are particularly responsive to the arrival of effective colleagues, but it’s 
not clear that novices are particularly influential in their ability to shape others’ performance. Applying 
these findings to TFA, where almost all of these corps members are novices, one may suspect that the 
density of TFA corps members likely has the strongest effect on other TFA corps members, and only a 
moderate effect on more experienced non-TFA teachers. Consequently, as we look for evidence of 
spillover effects from TFA corps members, we attempt to differentially identify spillover that may affect 
these two groups. 
There are important reasons spillover may be particularly influential for other TFA corps 
members, aside from the experience differential just described. In this case, spillover effects may be the 
result of having greater access to a support group of peers from similar backgrounds going through a 
shared experience in the TFA program. This support group may plausibly affect TFA corps members 
through traditional means of on-the-job performance (e.g., instruction or classroom management), or 
may additionally provide non-traditional spillover through off-the-job support (e.g., orienting them to a 
new city, socializing, or housing). Providing corps members with a group of other supportive corps 
members in the same school was one of TFA’s stated objectives of the clustering placement strategy to 
begin with; whether this support translates to increased classroom performance for these teachers is an 
empirical question that we investigate here. 
Expectations of TFA spillover onto more experienced, non-TFA colleagues, however, may seem 
unrealistic on the surface, given the corps members’ relative inexperience. Yet, during in-person 
interviews, multiple school principals expressed opportunity for TFA corps members to influence their 
colleagues’ practice, suggesting spillover could be plausible. The most common opportunity principals 
cited for TFA corps members to affect others’ practice was during common planning, a district-wide 
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effort to organize teachers of the same grade (in elementary grades) or subject (in secondary grades) in 
a regular shared planning period to coordinate efforts and promote mutual learning. One elementary 
school principal related, “Through common planning, the sharing of best practices, through our data 
checks, TFA corps members will show what worked—their determination spread, it’s contagious.” In 
addition, clustered TFA corps members may also influence other teachers across the school more 
broadly, which was confirmed by a district administrator, “When you have a few corps members in the 
same school, they tend to feed off of each other and often times there’s a big change in the school 
culture.” Several principals participating in the interviews indicated specific mechanisms through which 
these cultural changes may occur, including TFA corps members’ high energy levels, high expectations, 
and outreach to parents,  all of which they cited as being noticed and modeled by other teachers. Thus, 
if these behavioral spillovers translate into student achievement, a TFA spillover effect among all 
teachers broadly may be plausible, in spite of TFA corps members’ relative inexperience.7 
Considering how the spillover and composition effects interact in the context of a school 
turnaround is also relevant, given TFA’s partnership with the ETO, even though the clustering strategy 
was not originally designed to be a turnaround intervention. The literature on school turnaround 
recommends teacher workforce strategies that work through both managing the composition and 
improving the stock of teachers in the schools (and spillover may be one way these teachers improve). 
For instance, the IES School Turnaround Practice Guide (Herman, et al., 2008) identifies strategies such 
as building a committed staff (working through the composition effect) and signaling the need for 
dramatic change to change the school culture (which could feasibly spillover onto other teachers’ 
performance). Supporting evidence for these approaches is found in Hansen (2013), who concludes 
there is evidence of both better composition and improvements among the pre-existing stock of 
teachers that play a role in dramatically improving student achievement in low-performing schools. Both 
                                                          
7
 Using Australian data, Bradley, et al. (2007) find evidence of behavioral spillovers in teacher absences associated 
with the arrival of teacher colleagues that show prior patterns of high or low absences. The authors do not provide 
any evidence of this behavior’s effect on student achievement. 
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of these elements may plausibly be activated with the arrival of a cluster of TFA corps members to a 
struggling school, and hence may potentially play a vital role in achieving a successful transformation. 
V. Data   
To address the study’s research questions, we use detailed student-level administrative data 
that cover M-DCPS students linked to their teachers for five school years (2008-09 through 2012-13). M-
DCPS is the largest school district in Florida and the fourth largest in the United States. The district has 
large minority and disadvantaged student populations, typical of regions TFA has historically targeted; 
about 60% of its students are Hispanic, 30% black, and 10% white, and over 60% of students qualify for 
free or reduced price lunch.  
The student-level longitudinal data we use in the analysis contain reading and math scores on 
the Florida Comprehensive Achievement Test (FCAT).8 Students’ FCAT scale scores are converted to z-
scores based on the mean and standard deviation for that particular subject-grade test in the M-DCPS 
sample. Test scores in each year are outcomes, and prior-year test scores are used as controlling 
covariates in the value-added approach when estimating student outcomes used in the analysis 
(described further below). In addition to standardized test scores, we observe a variety of student 
characteristics: race, gender, free- or reduced-price lunch eligibility, limited English proficiency (LEP) 
status, whether a student is flagged as having a mental, physical, or emotional disability, attendance, 
and disciplinary incidents. In addition, all students are linked to teachers through data files that contain 
information on course membership.9 
                                                          
8
 From the 2008-09 school year through the 2010-2011 school year, all students between grades 3-10 took the 
FCAT in both math and reading. However, with the introduction of End-of-Course (EOC) exams in 2011-12, the 
mathematics portion of the FCAT will only be administered to grades 3-8 from 2011-2012 forward. For students 
taking an EOC exam in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 (for example, Algebra I), we consider their previous year’s FCAT 
score to be their lagged test score. See Appendix I for more information. 
9
 Teachers of record in students’ core math and reading courses are linked to them for the analysis. Student 
observations linked to multiple teachers (e.g., due to co-teaching, student mobility) are weighted in proportion to 
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Teacher personnel files in the M-DCPS data contain information on teachers’ experience levels, 
education attainment, demographics, and other supplemental background variables. These will likewise 
be used as covariates for various models in the analysis that follows. One variable included in the data is 
a flag on TFA corps members; given the importance of this variable in the analysis, we externally 
validated this variable with corps member lists from TFA.10 
The samples used for this analysis of TFA corps members’ spillover effects on student learning 
outcomes are, of necessity, limited to grades and subjects in which standardized tests are administered 
to students. Hence, the few schools in which all TFA corps members are placed outside of these grades 
and subjects are dropped from the sample. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the two samples 
utilized for the study (one for each subject: math and reading). The table groups schools within each 
sample separately by TFA cluster status, which we define as any school in which two or more corps 
members from the same cohort are placed starting in the summer of 2009 and after. 
As shown in Table 2, the cluster schools where TFA corps members have been placed since 2009 
tend to be very observationally dissimilar to the rest of the district. While about two-thirds of students 
in non-cluster schools are Hispanic, over three-fourths of cluster schools are black (based on student 
characteristics in the analysis sample in tested grades and subjects). In addition, the share of FRL eligible 
students is about 20 percentage points higher in placement schools. This is consistent with TFA 
placement patterns of choosing high needs schools in which to place its corps members. In addition, 
student achievement on the FCAT in cluster schools is about 0.6 and 0.5 standard deviations lower in 
reading and math, respectively. 
Differences also emerge with observable teacher characteristics, although not as stark as the 
differences between students. Teachers in non-cluster schools are about five percentage points more 
likely to have at least a Master’s degree, and average an additional 2-3 years of experience. By 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the amount of time spent with each teacher, based on available enrollment data. Please see Appendix I for more 
information.  
10
 Please see Appendix II for details on the matching process to validate this TFA flag. 
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construction, the share of TFA teachers is much higher in the cluster sample.11 Also, teachers in 
placement schools are significantly more likely to be black and less likely to be Hispanic, relative to the 
non-placement schools. 
As TFA corps members and alumni are the primary focus of this study, it is helpful to examine 
descriptive statistics of these placements over time for those appearing in the analysis sample. Table 3 
reports corps member placements over time included in the analysis sample (reporting information 
parallel to Table 1), and also presents descriptive statistics of the classrooms TFA teachers are leading. 
Note that the TFA proportion values and descriptive statistics include only active corps members; 
however, given the high attrition of TFA corps members out of the classroom after two years, these 
figures only slightly vary when reporting on active corps members and TFA alumni combined. For 
instance, cluster schools averaged less than one TFA alumni remaining in the school beyond the initial 
two-year commitment. 
Three particular elements of this Table 3 are worth highlighting. First, the schools with any TFA 
corps members that are included in the analysis sample tend to have even higher percentages of TFA in 
them (comparing against the percentages reported in the entire district in Table 1 above). This figures 
show TFA corps members are over-represented among tested grades and subjects, which is unsurprising 
as TFA teachers are most commonly granted a provisional license to teach in core academic subjects 
(math, science, and English/language arts) rather than untested subjects (e.g., history, art) that are 
omitted from the analysis sample. When conducting interviews, we did not find any evidence of 
principals systematically sorting TFA corps members to a teaching assignment that would be tested 
(conditional on the corps members’ license area). Principal responses were mixed, with some describing 
an inclination to staff TFA corps members specifically in tested grade/subject assignments, others 
                                                          
11
 There are some TFA corps members and TFA alumni in the non-cluster sample due to residual TFA corps 
members left over from before the cluster period. 
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describing a strategy that kept TFA out of these assignments for at least a year, and a third group 
reporting no particular strategy. 
The second pattern to note is a slight tendency for the classroom demographics of TFA teachers 
to become increasingly disadvantaged as the clustering strategy progressed over time, as measured by 
higher shares of black or FRL-eligible students. On the other hand, TFA teachers in the most recent three 
years received students whose previous reading test scores were better than in 2009-10 (-0.25 standard 
deviations in 2012-13 compared to -0.49 in 2009-10). Prior math scores also increase over time, though 
the increase is considerably smaller. 
And third, the table shows a large and notable jump in math test scores among students taught 
by TFA corps members. These post-test scores jump considerably in the last two years of data, an 
increase of 0.35 sd of student achievement, while the increase in pre-test scores during that period is 
only 0.03 sd. This jump in performance during these last two years is particularly noteworthy for two 
reasons: first, this jump in performance coincides with the largest single year-to-year increase in the 
total number of TFA corps members in the district (84 corps members, see Table 1); and second, it also 
coincides with the initiation of TFA’s formal partnership with the district’s ETO to help turnaround low-
performing schools. These two coincident events could potentially cloud our ability to identify a TFA 
spillover effect, as concurrent school-wide turnaround interventions will be confounded with the 
spillover effect if they are correlated with high-dosage TFA schools.  
This possible bias prompts us to plot the performance trajectories of TFA cluster schools with 
those of non-cluster, ETO schools; these are presented in Figure 1. This figure shows this large increase 
in math test scores appears to be common among both groups of schools; however, the surge in math 
test scores for TFA cluster schools appears to begin one year earlier in the cluster schools and is larger in 
magnitude than that observed among the remaining ETO schools. No apparent improvement is 
observed in reading test scores in either group; both groups showed declines relative to their 2008-09 
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performance. Note that most (26), but not all (29), TFA cluster schools are ETO schools, while the non-
cluster, ETO group contains 39 schools.12 Hence, to avoid attributing this rise in achievement solely to 
the TFA clustering strategy, we will control for year-specific ETO effects in our analysis.13 
VI. Empirical Strategy  
To address the study’s research question regarding the influence of TFA’s clustering strategy on 
overall school performance, we begin with a straightforward value-added regression predicting student 
achievement for student i in school s in classroom c at time t on test scores (    ) as a function of prior 
student achievement (     ), student characteristics (   ), classroom characteristics (   ), and a school 
fixed effect (  ).
14 Studies of TFA effectiveness generally estimate an equation similar to the following:15 
                                       . (1) 
Yet, the spillover effects of interest for this paper deal with TFA teachers affecting others, but 
how is that best empirically modeled? In order to address this question, we need to determine how to 
quantify the density of TFA teachers in schools. There are two dimensions to this measurement that 
must be considered: a) through what group are spillover effects transmitted? and b) how is the 
                                                          
12
 The list of schools considered ETO by the district changes has grown over the last several years; we identify a 
school as ETO if it is ever considered an ETO. The TFA Cluster group in Figure 1 includes all 29 TFA Cluster schools, 
regardless of ETO status. 
13
 When not controlling for ETO time trends, some estimates find a positive and significant effect on math test 
scores associated with increasing the TFA density within a school. As shown below, the regressions including ETO 
controls generally do not find TFA density to have a statistically significant effect on achievement. 
14
 The vector of prior-year test scores contains cubic functions of prior test scores in both reading and math. The 
vector of student characteristics includes the following: race, gender, free- or reduced-price lunch (FRL) eligibility, 
limited English proficiency (LEP) status, and mental, physical, or emotional disability status. The vector of 
classroom characteristics includes class size, classroom-level averages of prior-year test scores, and classroom-level 
averages of each of the student characteristics listed above. Teacher controls include teacher race, gender, 
experience, and whether the race of the teacher matches that of the student. The student characteristic, class 
average, and teacher demographic controls are interacted with grade indicator variables to allow differences in the 
influence of these variables across grades. The estimating equation additionally includes indicator variables on 
grades and years. 
15
 Studies using this approach include Boyd, et al., (2006); Clark, et al., (2013); Glazerman, et al., (2006); and Kane, 
et al., (2008). 
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composition of TFA teachers measured in the peer group? Both of these dimensions are discussed in 
turn below.  
First, how are spillover effects transmitted? The clustering strategy, as implemented in M-DCPS, 
focused on increasing the presence of TFA corps members in schools generally, so considering all 
teachers within a school as the relevant peer group would be a natural way to approach this problem. 
Yet, defining the peer group this way implies that TFA corps members’ influence is broad, potentially 
reaching others who do not share similar grade or subject assignments. If clusters of TFA affect the 
school culture in such a way as to promote greater productivity overall (e.g., due to higher student 
expectations or motivating other teachers to exert more effort), then a parameterization that defines a 
teacher’s peers broadly should pick up this type of spillover. Alternatively, spillover effects may be more 
concentrated. In select schools, TFA has worked with principals to stack a particular department 
(typically math or science) with TFA corps members. Learning between teachers during common 
planning may constitute the most tangible places for TFA corps members to affect others’ practices. In 
these cases, we would expect a parameterization that defines the peer group more narrowly would be 
more likely to identify the spillover effect.16 In the analysis that follows, we estimate models using two 
separate definitions of the relevant peer group—the first defines peers as any colleague within the 
school, the second defines peers as any colleague within the same grade (for elementary school 
teachers) or same subject (for middle and high school teachers). As shown below, results are mostly 
similar across these two definitions. 
Second, how is the composition of TFA teachers measured in the peer group? Again, there is no 
clear answer as to how to measure the density of TFA peer members for a given teacher—one could 
either directly count all TFA teachers with the peer group or convert that number to represent the 
proportion of peer teachers who are affiliated with TFA.  Given the ambiguity on how to quantify this 
                                                          
16
 Jackson and Bruegmann’s (2009) analysis of productivity spillovers in elementary schools measures teacher peer 
productivity at the grade level, looking at how variations in teacher peer quality in a teacher’s grade affects a given 
teacher’s productivity. 
  
  
15 
 
 
 
variable, we present the results from several different specifications. We separately run regressions with 
counts and percentage as the relevant measures; also, because spillover may affect peers in non-linear 
ways, we use various threshold values (both values in counts and proportions) to quantify differences in 
the composition of TFA teachers in the peer group.  
Next, we include these various measures of the TFA corps members’ concentration in a school 
(             ) interacted with the indicator for TFA corps member, as shown below: 
                                   
                                           . (2) 
In the above equation, TFA_DENSITY is a measure of TFA density. These measures of the TFA 
corps members are one of the various parameterizations just described (combining the relevant peer 
group with various measures of density). Theses parameters are intended to capture any differential in 
outcomes that may be associated with differences in the composition of the corps members within the 
implementation of the cluster strategy. The extent to which the point estimate on the baseline density 
variable (  ̂) remains statistically significant provides evidence of spillover among all non-TFA teachers 
generally, rather than changes in performance that are simply associated with the infusion of corps 
members. Finally,   ̂ captures the extent to which the spillover effects differentially accrue to TFA 
teachers.17 
Estimation of these equations above will provide a descriptive picture of the associations 
between the cluster strategy in a school and the school’s value-added performance. Yet, because the 
clustering strategy is implemented non-randomly across schools in the district (at minimum, we know 
selected schools had at least 70 percent of its students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch; other 
characteristics may have also played into the selection decision), the point estimates associated with the 
                                                          
17
 To allow for students with multiple teachers, regressions are run using the Full Roster Method (Hock and 
Isenberg, 2012), where observations are at the student-teacher link level, and are weighted differentially by 
teacher dosage. Please see Appendix I for more details.  
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clustering effect may be downward biased because targeted schools were likely targeted precisely 
because they were likely to have lower performance absent the intervention. As a result, we include 
both school fixed effects and controls for time-varying averages within classrooms such as student 
demographic characteristics and test scores. The inclusion of school fixed effects implies that the 
variation in schools’ densities of TFA teachers over time is driving the resulting estimates—differences in 
TFA densities across schools are ruled out in the resulting estimates. 
Finally, as shown above in Figure 1, there was a substantial increase in the average math test 
scores at schools involved with the ETO in recent years: both cluster and non-cluster. To avoid 
attributing this increase in performance to TFA’s clustering strategy, we control for a common ETO 
effect by including an interaction term between ETO and school year in our estimates of school spillover 
effects.   
VII. Results  
Estimating the Effects of TFA Corps Members on their Students 
To compare the TFA corps members in our study with previously-published research, we display 
the results of the basic teacher value-added regression represented by Equation (1) in Table 4. In all of 
the results that follow, all grades are combined into a single regression, with grade-specific intercepts 
and slopes for relevant control variables. Controls include cubic terms in a student’s previous math and 
reading scores, race, gender, FRL status (all interacted with grade level). In addition, we take class 
averages of these demographic variables and interact them with grade level. These estimates, therefore, 
can be interpreted to represent the contributions of TFA teachers over and above the average teacher 
with similar student backgrounds and test scores. Also interacted with grade level are teacher 
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demographics (race, race-matching with students, gender, and degree attainment) and class size.18 
Finally, we cluster standard errors at the school level. 
The first column shows a basic OLS regression while controlling for TFA and teacher experience 
separately. For math, consistent with previous papers, the TFA effect is positive and statistically 
significant. We also find a null effect for reading scores in our basic OLS regression shown in column 5. 
We next investigate whether TFA corps members have differential returns to experience by interacting 
TFA and years of experience (columns 2 and 6), and generally do not find a differential effect by 
experience. In other words, both TFA and non-TFA teachers become more effective over time at similar 
rates. Columns 3-4 (math) and 7-8 (reading) add school fixed effects, and find similar results, although 
the gain in math test scores associated with being taught by a TFA teacher becomes somewhat larger. 
This is presumably due to the TFA teacher coefficient being downwardly biased in OLS as corps members 
are placed in relatively disadvantaged schools; failing to add the school fixed effects attributes the 
school’s low performance trajectory to the corps members rather than to school-specific unobservable 
performance.19 
The magnitude of our TFA math effect – about 10% of a standard deviation of student learning 
on standardized test scores – falls roughly in the middle of previous studies. Relative to the papers 
discussed earlier, our estimate is somewhat smaller than Glazerman et al. (.15) and Xu et al. (.13), and 
larger than Clark et al. (.07), Kane et al. (.02), and Boyd et al. (no effect). The null effect we find in 
reading is expected, and is consistent with these prior studies finding no differential effect in reading. 
Because the impact of a 0.10 standard deviation improvement in test scores varies across school grades 
(representing approximately 20% of a school year in grade 4 and 40% of a school year in grade 10), we 
                                                          
18
 Teachers with missing values for experience are coded as 0 and are flagged with a missing experience indicator 
variable, which is included as a control in the regressions. 
19
 When not including any controls for experience, the TFA effect falls from 0.10 to 0.07 standard deviations. This 
drop is not surprising since TFA teachers tend to have fewer years of experience than the average non-TFA 
teacher. When allowing the TFA coefficient to vary over time without including experience controls, the TFA effect 
is 0.05 for a corps member’s first year, 0.07 in the second year, and 0.11 beyond the second year. 
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convert grade-specific TFA effects to months of student learning using the average annual gain 
estimates reported in Hill, et al. (2008).20 After converting, the weighted average TFA effects equate to a 
34% boost in learning beyond average annual student gains in math, or a non-significant 3% increase 
over annual learning gains in reading. In math, this effect is equivalent to 3.4 months of learning, based 
off of a 10-month school year, relative to the average student assigned to a non-TFA teacher in the same 
school. 
Estimating the Spillover Effects of TFA onto Colleagues’ Students 
We next turn to the main research questions of this paper: whether the density of TFA members 
in a school leads to a measureable change in other teachers’ performance beyond any composition 
effect. Regression results incorporating the parameters capturing spillover are presented in Table 5 (for 
math) and Table 6 (for reading). Panel A of each table shows results in which the peer group is defined 
as all colleagues within the school. Each column uses a different method of quantifying TFA density. The 
first column, “Count”, simply counts the number of TFA peers within a school. For example, in a school 
with five TFA corps members, the non-TFA teachers would be considered to have five TFA peers, while 
the TFA teachers would have four TFA peers (since we do not count a teacher as his or her own peer). 
The TFA effect continues to be statistically significant and positive. However, neither the density 
(measured as the count of TFA teachers in a school) nor the TFA * TFA Density interaction are 
statistically significant. In other words, although TFA corps members are, on average, more productive 
than non-TFA members, in this specification there are no additional measureable differences in student 
achievement associated with increasing the number of TFA teachers in a school, other than on those 
TFA teachers’ own students.  
The remaining columns of Panel A show the results from different specifications of TFA density. 
The second column, “Percent”, defines the TFA density to be the percent of other teachers in a school 
                                                          
20
 When estimating grade-specific coefficients for the TFA variable, the standard errors increase substantially, and 
most are not statistically distinguishable from other grades’ coefficients or zero. For brevity, we do not report 
them here.  
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that are TFA corps members, with similar effects. The remaining columns define a “TFA-dense” school to 
be one which has TFA density passing certain thresholds. For example, the third column tests whether 
there is a difference in student achievement associated with increasing the number of TFA teachers in a 
school to at least five. Finally, columns 5-8 explore whether there is an effect when the percentage of 
TFA teachers in a school passes a given threshold. In general, there is no evidence of spillovers to non-
TFA teachers from increased densities of TFA teachers, as measured by the Density coefficient. This is 
also true for the impact of TFA density on other TFA corps members. 
Panel B of both tables considers the same methods of defining TFA density, but rather than 
measuring density at the school level, we look at a more targeted peer group. For elementary schools, 
we consider a teacher’s peers to be those teachers in the same grade, and for secondary schools, in the 
same subject. Results are broadly similar to those in Panel A, and continue to be sensitive to how 
density is defined. Further complicating our ability to make statistical inference are the standard errors 
in columns 4-8. 
For reading achievement, presented in Table 6, results continue to be sensitive to specification. 
Point estimates of the TFA effect are positive, though not consistently statistically significant. The TFA 
spillover effect estimates, both onto TFA and non-TFA teachers, are generally negative, although few of 
these are statistically significant.  
In sum, the results do not find a consistent pattern of TFA density affecting student 
achievement. When simply using the number or percent of TFA teachers in a school or in a 
grade/subject as the relevant density measure among the peer group, we do not find that increasing the 
concentration of TFA teachers has any detectable effect on the productivity of either other TFA or other 
non-TFA members. However, in other models, the sign of the TFA interaction effect is sensitive to 
specification and not precisely estimated. 
Examining the Potential Tradeoff between Quality and Quantity in Clustering 
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As a final analysis, we investigate whether the increase in the quantity of TFA corps members 
placed in the clustering strategy was accompanied by a decrease in the classroom productivity of these 
corps members. This inquiry is motivated by the concern that the increase in TFA density over time 
(which we are using to identify spillover effects), if concurrent with a decrease in quality, may 
understate actual spillover, since the empirical model estimates a single TFA effect over the entire 
period.  
Not only is this possible drop in quality an empirical concern, but it is also a practical concern: 
when conducting interviews with district administrators, this was the primary concern voiced about the 
clustering program. One district administrator states, “I would revisit the way they are recruiting TFA; I 
think everyone recognizes that when you [have grown this much], there is obviously a danger in loss of 
quality.”  
Table 7 presents the results of our investigation into changes in TFA effect estimates over time.  
These results are produced by re-estimating the main TFA effects as detailed in Equation 1, and then 
adding either cohort-specific (on the left) or year-specific (on the right) interaction terms with the TFA 
indicator variable. If quality is declining with more recent placements, we expect to see a trend of 
negative point estimates on the interaction variables representing these placements. The cohort-specific 
point estimates show a moderate level of fluctuation over time, but no clear downward trend with later 
cohorts.21 The year-specific point estimates fluctuate less (as more corps members are included in each 
grouping), but again do not demonstrate a downward trend. These interaction estimates are not 
statistically significant in any of these regression models. Based on these results, we conclude the 
spillover effects estimated in Tables 5 and 6 are likely not tainted a concurrent drop in productivity 
among TFA estimates.22  
                                                          
21
 For the 2007 cohort, the data do not include their first year of teaching and there are very few observations, 
likely leading to the imprecise estimates found. 
22
 Though we do not find any clear empirical evidence of lower classroom productivity among more recent 
placements, this does not necessarily imply all TFA placements in the district are of the same quality over time. In 
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VIII. Discussions of Findings and Limitations 
There are a number of reasons that, even if there were a spillover effect associated with 
increasing the density of TFA corps members in a school, we may not be able to find it using our data. 
The first is due to the relatively short time horizon. It was only in 2010-2011 and especially 2011-2012 
and 2012-2013 when the share of TFA teachers within placement schools grew substantially. Since 2012-
2013 is the final year of our sample, we are only able to estimate the impact of TFA density on student 
performance in the short term. If TFA were to change teacher effectiveness over the course of multiple 
years, we would not yet be able to observe that process. The relatively short time period also limits the 
observed variation in TFA density, since there is a small sample of cluster schools (only 29) where TFA 
densities showed any meaningful variation and the rollout only happened in the most recent three 
years, likely leading to low precision in the estimates.  
The second limitation is the exclusive focus on student test scores in this study. Spillover effects 
from TFA corps members onto other teachers may be transmitted through a variety of behaviors, which 
may affect students, other teachers, or the school culture in many ways. In subsequent investigations 
with updated data, we will investigate other outcomes, such as student absences, the persistence of 
teacher effects among TFA corps members, and teacher retention. Further, our forthcoming analysis of 
the qualitative data collected during our semi-structured interviews with school and district 
administrators will provide additional nuance to the influence and the limitations of TFA corps members 
in these schools. 
Finally, previous literature has found that the magnitude of productivity spillovers across 
teachers is relatively small. Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) find that a one-standard-deviation increase 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
order to be included in the analysis sample, a teacher must be assigned to a tested grade and subject, and teach in 
this assignment for the full school year. If selection into these tested classroom assignments or the premature 
attrition of TFA corps members has changed during this period, the analysis in Table 7 will not detect them. Hence, 
while we use the results of Table 7 to remove the possibility of lower productivity clouding our spillover estimates, 
it should not be interpreted as definite evidence on the health of the TFA corps in the district overall. 
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in the mean estimated value-added of a teacher’s peers is associated with an increase of 0.0398 
standard deviations in math test scores. In our data, the average TFA teacher is about 40% of a standard 
deviation more effective than the average replacement teacher in teacher value added (authors’ 
calculation), so the expected increase in student test scores associated with replacing an average 
teacher with a TFA teacher would be  
 
 
              , 
where n represents the number of teachers in the relevant peer group (Jackson and Bruegmann use 
teachers within a grade and school in a sample of elementary school students). Thus, for a grade with 
five teachers, the expected increase in other students’ test scores due to adding a TFA teacher would be 
0.003 standard deviations. If an entire grade of average teachers were replaced with TFA teachers, the 
expected increase would be 0.016 standard deviations, an effect that is too small to detect given the 
standard errors in most specifications using the available data. However, the results produced here rule 
out the possibility of TFA corps members producing large spillover effects on both TFA and non-TFA 
teacher colleagues.  
IX. Conclusion 
The research questions motivating this study ask whether TFA corps members affect other 
teachers in their school—both non-TFA teachers and other TFA corps members—through spillover 
effects. We exploit the variation in TFA corps member densities within schools over time, which 
occurred due to the implementation of the TFA clustering placement strategy in M-DCPS, to investigate 
these questions. With student-teacher linked administrative data from M-DCPS, we estimate changes in 
teacher effectiveness in reading and math that are associated with changes in TFA teacher densities 
using a school fixed effects model. 
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In summary, we find little evidence of spillover effects from TFA corps members on student test 
scores in the short term—neither on non-TFA teachers nor on TFA corps members in the same schools. 
In spite of the finding of no spillover effect, we do find robust evidence of TFA effects on math test 
scores in the range of 10 percent of a standard deviation of student achievement, or averaging over 3 
months of learning. And, as discussed above, the lack of significant spillover effects on learning does not 
necessarily imply TFA has no effect on schools beyond their assigned classrooms. Rather, this finding 
invites further examination on whether TFA corps members affect peers’ or their schools’ performance 
in other ways, or over longer time periods.  
Was the cluster placement strategy a success in M-DCPS? It may be, in spite of the lack of 
spillover. TFA stated two primary objectives in designing and implementing the cluster placement 
strategy: a) to accelerate TFA’s influence in student outcomes in particularly disadvantaged settings, and 
b) to provide more support for TFA corps members through an increased presence in schools and in the 
district overall. While spillover was an expected result of the strategy, it was not a primary objective. 
Given the observed patterns of corps member placement in recent years, it is clear that TFA’s presence 
in the district has substantially increased, and the presence of TFA in some of the highest-need schools 
in the district has likewise increased. Thus, the composition effect alone—where vacancies in high-need 
schools are filled with relatively effective TFA corps members in math—implies that TFA’s increased 
presence has made a significant difference on student math outcomes in the district. In this way, the 
clustering strategy has at least partially achieved its objectives. Furthermore, we do not find any 
evidence that the large increase in the number of TFA placements in recent years was associated with a 
reduction in TFA effectiveness. 
The results here, however, provide no evidence of spillover on student test scores in the short 
term. In other words, there is no reason to expect that the extra student gains for TFA corps members 
under the clustering strategy would be any different (in the aggregate) than the gains that could result 
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from an alternate placement strategy where corps members were more evenly distributed across 
schools. Yet, even if the placement strategy does not affect teacher spillover, how teachers are placed 
across schools will affect district-wide achievement gaps—broad placement of TFA corps members will 
boost many students’ math performance slightly, while focusing on high-need schools boosts student 
achievement in math in a more targeted way. By focusing these placement efforts in some of the most 
disadvantaged and low-performing schools in the district, rather than spreading corps members broadly 
across many schools, the clustering strategy has accelerated growth in schools that are in greatest need, 
and within-district achievement gaps are likely reduced as a result. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Note: Graphs show trajectories of average student achievement (standardized to a 
mean of zero, with a sd of 1) among TFA cluster schools and non-cluster, ETO schools. 
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Table 1. Active TFA Corps Member Assignments 
    
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
2011-
12 
2012-
13 
Total TFA Corps Members 92 93 140 224 285 
Total schools containing any TFA Corps Members 49 36 25 25 32 
TFA as proportion of school teachers by school type, conditional on containing TFA 
  Elementary 3.8% 4.3% 9.0% 19.3% 14.9% 
  Middle  3.7% 8.2% 8.3% 17.2% 17.5% 
  High 2.0% 2.9% 10.7% 13.3% 13.6% 
Note: Proportions of schools teachers by school type are calculated among any schools 
containing any TFA corps members during that school year. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Analysis Samples 
  Reading Math 
  
Non-TFA 
Cluster 
School 
TFA 
Cluster 
schools 
Non-TFA 
Cluster 
School 
TFA 
Cluster 
schools 
Student-level Variables 
    Black 19.17% 77.54% 20.62% 77.19% 
Hispanic 68.65% 21.19% 68.83% 21.71% 
FRL Eligible 68.04% 87.92% 71.67% 88.93% 
Math Achievement 
  
0.036 -0.462 
  
(0.991) (0.987) 
Reading Achievement 
0.209 -0.392 
  (0.953) (0.911) 
  
Unexcused Absences 
4.25 8.52 4.29 8.55 
(6.13) (9.59) (6.17) (9.54) 
Out-of-School Suspension Absences 
0.44 1.51 0.49 1.70 
(2.43) (4.50) (2.59) (4.87) 
Total student-year observations 834,054 63,825 755,114 54,351 
Teacher-level variables 
    MA Degree or higher 36.69% 32.14% 34.09% 29.06% 
Years of Experience 
13.0 10.2 12.8 9.6 
(9.7) (9.0) (9.7) (8.9) 
TFA Corps Member 0.14% 11.60% 0.15% 13.79% 
Black 21.19% 56.62% 21.08% 51.22% 
Hispanic 42.57% 13.67% 42.86% 18.75% 
Total teacher-year observations 23,561 1,895 18,778 1,552 
Total unique schools 431 29 435 29 
Note:  TFA cluster schools are schools in which 2 or more new TFA corps members were placed in 
the same cohort for any cohort during or after the summer of 2009. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses for outcome variables.  
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Table 3. Corps Members Assignments in the Analysis Sample 
 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
Total TFA Corps Members 43 48 72 108 145 
Total schools containing any TFA Corps Members 32 25 22 22 25 
TFA as proportion of school teachers by school type, conditional on containing any TFA 
  Elementary 12.0% 12.8% 17.6% 22.2% 30.0% 
  Middle  5.6% 10.1% 10.6% 22.3% 30.7% 
  High 3.3% 5.7% 17.2% 20.0% 22.0% 
Average classroom characteristics for TFA teachers 
 
Percent Black 69.7% 72.4% 78.3% 79.3% 77.80% 
 
Percent  Hispanic 28.6% 26.3% 21.1% 19.6% 21.10% 
 
Percent FRL 87.0% 92.6% 92.1% 93.5% 91.70% 
 
Reading Achievement 
-0.26 -0.52 -0.33 -0.31 -0.29 
 
(0.84) (0.89) (0.83) (0.80) (0.82) 
 
Math Achievement  
-0.42 -0.44 -0.48 -0.28 -0.13 
 
(0.89) (0.92) (0.96) (0.92) (0.94) 
 
Lagged Reading Achievement 
- -0.49 -0.22 -0.2 -0.25 
 
- (0.85) (0.8) (0.79) (0.81) 
 
Lagged Math Achievement  
- -0.43 -0.42 -0.33 -0.39 
 
- (0.89) (0.88) (0.91) (0.86) 
Note: Proportions of schools teachers by school type are calculated among any schools containing any 
TFA corps members during that school year. 
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Table 4. Establishing Baseline TFA Estimates 
  Math Reading 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
TFA 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.007 -0.005 0.012 0.007 
 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.020) (0.025) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) 
TFA * 1 years experience 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.010 
 
0.004 
 
-0.009 
  
(0.030) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
TFA * 2 years experience 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.010 
 
0.032 
 
0.017 
  
(0.038) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
TFA * 3-4 years experience 
 
0.032 
 
0.060 
 
0.060 
 
0.042 
  
(0.083) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.036) 
1 year experience 0.039** 0.046** 0.032** 0.036 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 
 
(0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.022) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) 
2 years experience 0.052*** 0.055** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.021* 0.013 0.008 0.005 
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
3-4 years experience 0.047*** 0.050** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.025** 0.019* 0.014 0.012 
 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
5-9 years experience 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.030*** 0.024** 0.018* 0.016 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
10+ years experience 0.037** 0.040** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.032*** 0.026** 0.017* 0.015 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Observations 740680 740680 740680 740680 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 
R-squared 0.644 0.644 0.651 0.651 0.698 0.698 0.701 0.701 
OLS  
 
   
 
  
School Fixed Effects            
Note: School fixed effects models, with indicator variables on grade and year. Regression controls for student-level and class 
average demographics and cubic previous test scores, and their interactions with grade. Other controls include class size and 
teacher race and their interactions with grade. 
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Table 5. Estimates of Spillover Effects From TFA Teachers on Student Outcomes in Math 
Peer 
Group 
  Count Percent Count >= 5 Pct. >=5 Pct. >= 10 Pct. >= 15 Pct. >= 20 Pct. >= 30 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Panel A: Peers defined as school colleagues             
Sc
h
o
o
l 
TFA 0.075*** 0.114*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 0.121*** 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
 
(0.024) (0.030) (0.027) (0.035) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) 
Density 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.050 0.013 0.002 -0.015 0.014 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.023) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.043) 
TFA * TFA Density 0.001 -0.002 -0.056* -0.061 -0.051* -0.016 -0.017 -0.081*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.031) (0.039) (0.031) (0.035) (0.025) (0.026) 
Observations 740680 740680 740680 740680 740680 740680 740680 740680 
R-squared 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 
Panel B: Peers defined as grade colleagues (in elementary grades) or subject colleagues (in middle / high grades)   
G
ra
d
e
 (
e
le
m
e
n
ta
ry
) 
/ 
Su
b
je
ct
 (
m
id
d
le
/h
ig
h
) 
TFA 0.094*** 0.116*** 0.092*** 0.136*** 0.113*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.086*** 
 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.023) (0.038) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) 
Density 0.007 0.001 0.038 0.046** 0.030 -0.014 -0.032 -0.023 
 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.038) (0.018) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) 
TFA * TFA Density -0.002 -0.002 0.010 -0.065 -0.039 -0.009 -0.000 0.028 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.033) (0.042) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.048) 
Observations 740680 740680 740680 740680 740680 740680 740680 740680 
R-squared 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 
Note: School fixed effects models, with indicator variables on grade and year. Regression controls for student-level and class average 
demographics and cubic previous test scores, and their interactions with grade. Other controls include class size and teacher race and 
their interactions with grade. 
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Table 6. Estimates of Spillover Effects From TFA Teachers on Student Outcomes in Reading 
Peer 
Group 
  Count Percent Count >= 5 Pct. >=5 Pct. >= 10 Pct. >= 15 Pct. >= 20 Pct. >= 30 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Panel A: Peers defined as school colleagues             
Sc
h
o
o
l 
TFA 0.037** 0.036* 0.030 0.050*** 0.038** 0.027 0.026* 0.012 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) 
Density -0.000 -0.000 0.009 0.013 -0.002 -0.017 -0.011 -0.012 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.026) 
TFA * TFA Density -0.002*** -0.001 -0.026 -0.053** -0.040* -0.022 -0.027 0.007 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) 
Observations 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 
R-squared 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 
Panel B: Peers defined as grade colleagues (in elementary grades) or subject colleagues (in middle / high grades)   
G
ra
d
e
 (
e
le
m
e
n
ta
ry
) 
/ 
Su
b
je
ct
 (
m
id
d
le
/h
ig
h
) 
TFA 0.029* 0.027 0.024* 0.048** 0.011 0.020 0.019 0.014 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
Density -0.001 0.000 -0.015 0.022* -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 -0.027 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) 
TFA * TFA Density -0.005** -0.001 -0.036** -0.055** 0.004 -0.014 -0.015 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.018) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) 
Observations 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 1156648 
R-squared 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 
Note: School fixed effects models, with indicator variables on grade and year. Regression controls for student-level and class average 
demographics and cubic previous test scores, and their interactions with grade. Other controls include class size and teacher race and 
their interactions with grade. 
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Appendix I. Data Cleaning Rules for Analysis  
 
Various processes were undertaken during the course of the data analysis to create credible 
estimates of the TFA clustering effects. This appendix documents these various considerations and 
processes. 
Tests Included in the Sample 
Our final analysis sample spans grades 4-10 and contains FCAT Reading, FCAT Mathematics, and 
Algebra EOC test scores. Each test score is standardized (z-scores) within year, grade, subject, and test 
type, relative to the district sample. Because pre-test scores are needed as covariates in the regression, 
FCAT scores for 3rd grade (the first tested grade) are used as pre-test scores only (i.e., 3rd grade 
observations do not appear in the analysis).   
Up through the 2010-11 school year, it is possible for students in later grades to have taken two 
different mathematics tests in a year, the FCAT Math and the Algebra EOC exam.  For those students, we 
only use their FCAT Math score. Starting in 2011-12, FCAT Math is no longer tested in grades 9 and 10, 
though the Algebra EOC exam continues to be tested at the conclusion of the Algebra course (which 
some students may take for the first time as early as 7th grade or as late as 10th grade). In this case, 
Algebra EOC exam scores are only used when a student would otherwise be missing a math test score in 
the current year (i.e., in grades 9 and 10). For students taking Algebra in 7th or 8th grade, the FCAT Math 
score is used in those years, and those students’ 9th and 10th grade math observations are not included 
in the analysis. 
Linking Students with Teacher 
Course membership files in the data are used to identify the classes in which students receive 
instruction and the teachers to whom they are assigned. Students may be linked with multiple teachers 
in their course membership files (because of either switching classes mid-year, taking multiple classes in 
the same subject, or due to co-teaching arrangements).  
Core Courses 
When estimating value-added we want to distribute student learning across all teachers in 
courses relevant to the tested subjects. As a result, it is important to distinguish between courses that 
focus on developing skills in tested subjects rather than elective courses that may only be tangentially 
related to a tested subject. For example, for math value added we want to include an Algebra course but 
exclude a computer science course that may be offered through the mathematics department and thus 
labeled in the data under a math course code. We call courses focused on tested subjects core courses 
(CCs). 
We developed the following rules to help identify core courses for all students in the sample.  
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1) A course is flagged as a CC if 50% or more of the students in the district in that grade 
and year are enrolled in that same course (defined by the course code).  
2) Any course that enrolls 10 or more students without a CC (as determined by the first 
condition) is flagged as a CC for all students in that year and grade. 
All non-CC student-teacher links are discarded. Teacher dosages (detailed below) are calculated 
based off of the remaining student-teacher links in CCs. 
Estimating Regressions with Teacher Dosage 
To properly attribute each teacher’s contribution to a particular student’s learning, we employ 
the Full Roster Method, developed by Hock and Isenberg (2012) of Mathematica Policy Research. This 
method retains all student-teacher-course links labeled as core courses, and calculates a “teacher 
dosage” for each student-teacher link.   
The M-DCPS data used for the analysis reports course membership for students and teachers by 
terms, where each term represents half of the total exposure to a subject a student receives in a 
particular year (i.e., semesters). For each term we distribute the term-subject dosage (.5) across each of 
the student-teacher-course links observed. The term weights are added together to get the share of the 
total student-subject exposure that can be attributed to that student-teacher-course link such that the 
sum across all student-teacher-course links within a subject is 1. If a student leaves the sample at some 
point in the year, their student-subject exposure may be less than 1. 
Consider the example presented in Appendix Table 1 below. Student A has four student-
teacher-course links in ELA for the 2011-12 school year. Three of these courses take place in the first 
term, the column labeled “# tchs in term 1” illustrates this value. Term 1’s total student-subject 
exposure is .5 which is distributed across all three of these student-teacher-course links, the column 
labeled “tch dos t1” represents the share of the term 1 dosage attributed to that student-teacher-course 
link. The same situation is true for term 2. Two of these courses are half year courses and the other two 
are full year courses; summing the dosage for each term gives more weight to the full year courses and 
less weight to the half year courses.  
Appendix Table 1: Example of Assigning Teacher Dosages 
student year classid tchid 
Tch 
term1 
Tch 
term2 
# tchs 
in 
term1 
# tchs 
in 
term2 
Tch dose 
t1 
Tch dose 
t2 tch_dosage 
A 2012 843611 α 1 0 3   0.166667 0 0.1666667 
A 2012 843421 β 1 1 3 3 0.166667 0.1666667 0.3333333 
A 2012 843495 β 1 1 3 3 0.166667 0.1666667 0.3333333 
A 2012 843623 δ 0 1   3 0 0.1666667 0.1666667 
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These full-year teacher dosages are incorporated into the value added estimations as a student level 
analysis weight in Stata. Regressions are run using the areg command, which estimates dummy variables 
for each school fixed effect included in the model. 
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Appendix II. Identifying TFA Corps Members in the M-DCPS 
Administrative Data 
The clustering strategy evaluation requires the accurate identification of TFA corps members in 
the M-DCPS administrative data. M-DCPS maintains its own TFA flag in the data, but based on prior 
studies’ experiences identifying TFA corps members in other administrative data systems, matching a list 
of actual TFA corps members supplied by TFA to externally validate the TFA variable in the M-DCPS data 
was desirable. This appendix documents the reconciliation between the M-DCPS variable and the TFA-
supplied lists. 
M-DCPS Variable 
The TFA indicator variable maintained in M-DCPS’s administrative data is intended to flag active 
corps members in M-DCPS only. In total, 379 unique teachers are flagged as TFA in the M-DCPS data. 
TFA alumni that stay in the classroom beyond the two-year TFA commitment are not flagged in the data. 
This indicator variable flags specific teacher IDs only—this list must then be merged onto teacher 
personnel data in the M-DCPS data to determine teachers’ identities. Not all teachers’ personnel data is 
accurate or complete, and some have missing names—the key matching variable with the TFA lists.  
TFA Lists 
Teach For America maintains databases of corps members’ placements both regionally and 
nationally, and these separate data sources are not necessarily synchronized. TFA provided three 
separate lists for the purpose of validating the TFA flag in the M-DCPS data: 
1. A corps member list from the TFA National Office (date: 5/2013)  
2. A corps member list from the TFA Miami Regional Office (date: 5/2013) 
3. A corps member list from the TFA Miami Regional Office (date: 8/2013) 
All of these lists are to represent corps members placed in Miami since the summer of 2007 to 
current. To facilitate matching on other characteristics, these lists detail the school and year of initial 
placement (when known) in addition to teachers’ names. None of these three TFA lists overlap perfectly 
– though the National list (list 1) and the August Regional list (list 3) have the most names in common 
between them; all three lists have names that are unique to each of them.  
Also, the Miami Regional Office supplied lists twice (lists 2 and 3 above), though the August 
Regional (list 3 above) is considered the best representation of actual teachers in M-DCPS schools. The 
May Regional list (list 2 above) was apparently a comprehensive list of all corps members assigned to 
the TFA region during the study period, though this includes persons who 1) never actually showed up to 
begin TFA’s summer training institute, or 2) left the program before the school year officially began. The 
updated August Regional list identified and removed these persons, which is why it is preferred.  
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Reconciliation 
To reconcile these lists, we merged all lists from TFA against the M-DCPS list of teachers (both 
those flagged as TFA and those not flagged as TFA). Note that this was done only for placements up 
through the 2012-13 school year, because this is the extent of the M-DCPS data. Matching was done 
primarily with exact matches on names. Where names did not have an exact match but only an 
approximate match, initial placement school and year was used to corroborate the match. 
Appendix Table 2 below accounts for all unique teachers by source. 
Appendix Table 2: Reconciling TFA Corps Member Lists for Analysis 
Panel A: Reconciliation by Source of Match   
TFA Lists Corresponding with M-DCPS TFA Variable   
  National list & M-DCPS 4 
  August Regional & M-DCPS 2 
  May Regional & M-DCPS 6 
  National list, August Regional & M-DCPS 30 
  National list, May Regional & M-DCPS 1 
  National list, May Regional, August Regional & M-DCPS 320 
  A) Total flagged in at least one TFA list & M-DCPS 363 
TFA Lists Matched with Unflagged M-DCPS Teacher   
  National list & Unflagged in M-DCPS 1 
  National list, May Regional, August Regional & Unflagged in M-DCPS 161 
  B) Total matched from TFA lists but Unflagged in M-DCPS 162 
TFA Lists Not Matched with M-DCPS Teachers   
  National list 72 
  May Regional list 3 
  National list & August Regional 6 
  National list, May Regional & August Regional 10 
  C) Total Not Matched with M-DCPS Teachers 91 
Flagged M-DCPS Teachers Not Matched with TFA Lists   
  D) Total Only Identified in M-DCPS 16 
Panel B: Final Counts of TFA Teachers for Analysis   
Total Unique Teachers on TFA Lists (A+B+C) 616 
Total Unique Teachers Flagged as TFA in M-DCPS (A+D) 379 
Total Unique Teachers  (A+B+C+D) 632 
Total Unique Teachers Identified as TFA for Analysis (A+B+D) 541 
In total, 541 unique teachers were matched across the TFA lists and the M-DCPS administrative 
data. For 363 of these cases, we are highly confident in this match, as both M-DCPS and TFA agree on 
the TFA designation. The remaining 178 unique TFA-flagged teachers that are used in the analysis were 
identified as TFA in only one data source (B+D).  
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The 91 persons appearing on the TFA lists but not in the M-DCPS data (C) are larger than anticipated, yet 
the majority of these come from either the National or May Regional lists, which are the less-preferred 
lists. The most-preferred August Regional list only includes 16 unique persons that cannot be matched 
with the M-DCPS data. It is possible that some of these 91 cases are actually included in the M-DCPS 
data and flagged as TFA teachers, but cannot be matched because of name discrepancies or missing 
values. 
Overall, we feel highly confident the TFA indicators created for this analysis credibly identify real TFA 
corps members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
